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Abstract:  This paper traces a Kantian and pragmatist line of thinking that connects the ideas 
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of objectivity, which he developed as an extended argument stretching from the transcendental 
deduction through the analogies of experience to the regulative maxims of reason and reflective 
judgment.  In related ways in Lewis and Sellars, the very idea of an object of knowledge (and of 
intentionality more generally) is connected with a certain lawfulness or modal constraint the 
necessary representation of which, they argue, is an achievement of conceptualization.  While 
Sellars agreed with the spirit of Lewis’s famous pragmatic conception of the a priori, Sellars’s 
conception of meaning and conceptual content differed in crucial ways with important 
consequences for this issue.  I argue furthermore that a certain phenomenalist temptation 
threatens to spoil this insight both among some of Kant’s interpreters and in Lewis’s thought. 
Finally, I point out that Brandom’s “Kant-Sellars thesis” provides new support for this line of 
thought. Although questions concerning idealism continue to raise controversies for neo-
Kantians and pragmatists, the line of thought itself represents a distinctive and still promising 
approach to questions concerning intentionality and conceptual content. 
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* * * 
 
 
 There is an enduring Kantian and pragmatist line of thinking that connects the ideas of 
conceptual content, object cognition, and modal constraints in the form of counterfactual sustaining 
causal laws.  It is an idea that extends from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason through C. I. Lewis’s Mind and 
the World-Order to the Kantian naturalism of Wilfrid Sellars and the analytic pragmatism of Robert 
Brandom.  Kant put forward what I characterize as a modal conception of objectivity, which he 
developed as an extended argument stretching from the transcendental deduction through the 
analogies of experience to the regulative maxims of reason and reflective judgment.  In related ways in 
Lewis and Sellars, the very idea of an object of knowledge (and of intentionality more generally) is 
connected with a certain lawfulness or modal constraint the necessary representation of which, they 
argue, is an achievement of conceptualization.  While Sellars agreed with the spirit of Lewis’s famous 
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pragmatic conception of the a priori, Sellars’s conception of meaning and conceptual content differed 
in crucial ways with important consequences for this issue.  I argue furthermore that a certain 
phenomenalist temptation threatens to spoil this insight both among some of Kant’s interpreters and 
in Lewis’s thought.  Finally, I point out that Brandom’s “Kant-Sellars thesis” provides new support 
for this line of thought.  Although questions concerning idealism continue to raise controversies for 
neo-Kantians and pragmatists, this central line of thought itself represents a distinctive and still 
promising approach to questions concerning intentionality and conceptual content. 
 
 
I.  Beginning with Kant on Concepts of Objects as Prescribing Laws to Appearances 
 
 
 It will be helpful to begin with some familiar themes from the transcendental deduction in 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.  In section §26 of the B-Deduction, Kant states that the “[c]ategories are 
concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances, thus to nature as the sum total of all appearances...” 
(CPR B163). 1   These categorial laws are subsequently identified with the principles of pure 
understanding “in accordance with which everything (that can even come before us as an object) 
necessarily stands under rules, since, without such rules, appearances could never amount to cognition 
of an object corresponding to them” (CPR A158–9/B197–8).  The two constitutive “mathematical” 
pure principles, the axioms and anticipations, prescribe laws of extensive and intensive magnitude to 
all possible appearances considered merely as directly sensorily intuitable and (with respect to their 
form) a priori constructible realities in time.  The regulative “dynamical” principles such as the 
analogies of experience, however, prescribe laws governing the existence of appearances in nature in 
their necessary temporal relations to one another, for example, as substances enduring through change, 
or as causal sequences of states in time.  By “nature (in the empirical sense),” Kant thus tells us, he 
understands “the combination of appearances as regards their existence, in accordance with necessary 
rules, i.e., in accordance with laws” – the “transcendental laws of nature,” as he calls them (CPR 
A216/B263).   Particular discoverable empirical laws of nature conform to, but are not directly 
derivable from these transcendental laws, a relationship that Kant treats among other places under the 
headings of the regulative maxims of reason and reflective judgment. 
 
The fundamental idea that the categories prescribe laws to nature is thus connected with the 
very possibility that “appearances could ... amount to cognition of an object corresponding to them” 
(CPR A158–9/B197–8, quoted above).  One central theme in the transcendental deduction is Kant’s 
contention that the possibility of our self-conscious or apperceptive form of experience requires the 
concept of a certain a priori necessary combination or synthetic unity in the manifold items of our 
experience; and this Kant identifies with the concept of an object of experience in general.2  Section §19 
of the B-Deduction analyzes “the aim of the copula is” in a judgment as serving “to distinguish the 
objective unity of given representations from the subjective” (CPR B142).  As Kant there concludes: 
 
 
1 References to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) will be to the standard “A” and “B” paginations of the first 
(1781) and second (1787) editions respectively, using the translation by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood in the 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press, 1998), and throughout preserving 
the boldface emphases of the original. 
 
2 I offer an exposition and analysis of the transcendental deduction in O’Shea 2012, chapter four. 
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In accordance with the latter [subjective validity] I could only say ‘If I carry a body, I feel a 
pressure of weight,’ but not ‘It, the body, is heavy,’ which would be to say that these two 
representations are combined in the object, i.e., regardless of any difference in the condition 
of the subject, and are not merely found together in perception... (CPR B142) 
 
The judged combination is thus represented as objective in so far as it is represented as obtaining 
“regardless of” or independently of the particular condition of the perceiving subject.   The following 
well-known passage from the Second Analogy both reiterates and further clarifies this Kantian analysis 
of the concept of an object corresponding to our representations: 
 
[A]ppearance, in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can thereby only be 
represented as the object that is distinct from them if it stands under a rule that distinguishes 
it from every other apprehension, and makes one way of combining the manifold necessary.  
That in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is 
the object. (CPR A191/B236; cf. A104–5) 
 
The claim is that the representation of an appearance as an object distinct from its apprehension 
requires that the appearance fall under a rule that distinguishes as necessary some particular way of 
combining the apprehended manifold.  The object is then “that in the appearance” which is 
represented by “this necessary rule of apprehension.”   
 
To take the familiar example of the successive apprehension of an unchanging house, Kant 
indicates that in contrast to the “rule [that] is always to be found in the perception of that which 
happens,” for example in the perception of an object undergoing an alteration, in the case of the house 
the implicit conceptual rule prescribes inter alia that one “could have apprehended the manifold of 
empirical intuition from the right or from the left” (CPR A192/B238).  We thus conceive the object 
and its parts to be such that “the order in the synthesis of the apprehension of this manifold is 
indifferent” (CPR A211/B258); that is, different orders in our apprehension are conceived to have 
been possible in this case, with the particular ordering in each such scenario being determined by our 
conception of the coexisting order of parts in the object itself.  In the perception of a ship moving 
downstream, by contrast, we conceive the successive contents in our apprehension to be determined 
by a succession or alteration of states in the object itself, such that even if our positioning had been 
different, the “subjective sequence of apprehension” would still have been appropriately determined 
by “the objective sequence of appearances” (CPR A193/B238).  So our cognition of any objective 
empirical ordering in time as either coexistent or successive, and as thus obtaining independently of 
our apprehension of it, involves the concept of an ordering in the object that is such as to determine not 
only what we did perceive, but what would be or must be perceived in various counterfactual 
circumstances.3   
 
 
3 Similarly in the First Analogy, Kant argues that the cognition of any objective duration in time requires 
conceiving our successive apprehensions to represent the changing determinations of some objectively 
persisting substance, rather than representing the absolute annihilation or creation of substance itself.  The 
cognition of an object or objective ordering in time as such, on Kant’s analysis, thus presupposes the conceptual 
rule that what we apprehend, and what we could have or would have apprehended, is determined by identities 
and orderings that obtain in the objects themselves, independently of our apprehension of them.  (By “the 
objects themselves” in this context, of course, I am referring to the domain of empirical objects, not to the 
problematic idea of unknowable “things in themselves”) 
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As one might put it, the cognition of objective temporal relations obtaining among the objects 
of our possible experience presupposes the representation of certain modal constraints on our possible 
experiences or apprehensions of those objective realities.  The key further step in Kant’s various 
arguments that are based on the above conceptual analysis, finally, is that since time itself cannot be 
perceived, the presupposed modal constraints must find their representation in relations among the 
objects themselves; and this is achieved precisely by means of the conceptual representation of laws or 
rules of objective persistence, necessitation, and mutual interaction governing the empirical objects 
themselves, independently of our apprehension of them.  This is the sense in which the categories, as 
we saw Kant put it at the outset, are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to nature considered as the 
sum total of all appearances.  
 
An important further point to note, I believe, is that the a priori prescriptions or rules that are 
thus expressed in the categories and principles of pure understanding are second-order transcendental 
principles the proper first-order instantiations or realizations of which are embodied in the various 
inherited, learned, or hypothesized empirical concepts, empirical laws, and empirical kinds in terms of 
which we describe and re-describe the encountered world in both science and common life.  The 
Second Analogy, for example, in effect elucidates what it takes to be a causal concept, and this is realized 
in the fallible (and regulative maxim-guided) empirical hypothesis, for instance, that it was the heat of 
the sun that melted the wax, and thus would melt wax again in relevantly similar circumstances.  The 
second analogy does not tell us what causes what – that is a matter of ordinary and scientific empirical 
hypothesis formation, for instance – but it does as a principle require that every alteration or happening 
must at some level fall under some in principle cognizable first-order rule of empirical causal 
necessitation or other, whether assumed or to be discovered.4  In this way, on Kant’s view, our fallible 
empirical concepts no less than the a priori concepts or categories prescribe laws to appearances. 
 
Whatever one might think about the merits of Kant’s outlook on our conceptual cognition, I 
think there are certain obstacles to a proper understanding of his view.  I also think that a mixture of 
both the insights contained in and the obstacles to appreciating Kant’s view of concepts of objects as 
prescribing laws to appearances resurface in the pragmatist tradition.  First, then, I want to point out 
one persistent obstacle to a proper understanding of Kant’s views on concepts, laws, and objectivity, 
at least as I have sketched those views above. 
 
While there is much in P. F. Strawson’s well-known reconstruction of Kant on objectivity and 
unity that I take to be both correct and deeply insightful, his charge that the argument of Kant’s Second 
Analogy “proceeds by a non sequitur of numbing grossness” illustrates the particular obstacle to 
understanding that I have in mind (Strawson 1966, 137).  Suppose that one begins by approaching 
Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy from the start, as I think Strawson in this context does, by 
assuming that one already has at hand the common sense distinction between our perceptions of 
objects on the one hand and the objects themselves on the other – for example, the distinction between 
the object’s successive alteration from state A to state B, as opposed to one’s perception of A and 
perception of B.  But now, Strawson points out, if we assume that state A is followed by state B in the 
object, then it is indeed true, he “grants” to Kant, that the corresponding perceivings of A and of B 
will occur only in some corresponding order that is dependent on the ordering of the objectively 
successive states themselves.  But this does not require, Strawson objects, that the objective sequence 
of states “A followed by B” must itself instantiate or reflect a relation of causal necessitation.  For 
 
4 For my own further analyses of these matters, along with appropriate qualifications as well as references to the 
literature on Kant, cf. O’Shea 2012. 
 5 
example, the objective succession could be an entirely accidental sequence as far as the above point 
about the necessary determination of our corresponding perceptions is concerned.  According to 
Strawson, then, Kant has confused the necessity that our perceptions are determined in intelligible 
ways by the objective events that we thereby perceive, with a supposed proof that a relation of causal 
necessity must govern the objective events themselves.  This is the alleged non sequitur. 
 
But Strawson’s objection misses the point, at least on the reconstruction of Kant’s views that 
I offered above.  Kant’s argument was that our perceptual apprehension of any objective temporal 
ordering of states A and B as such is itself possible only under the conception that state B was causally 
produced by some preceding state of the object or objects themselves.  Strawson’s objection starts out 
from the common sense distinction between subjective perceptions and objective temporal orderings 
that Kant’s analysis is designed to show presupposes the validity of the transcendental principle of 
causality as already governing those objective orderings themselves.  To infer that Kant’s analysis is 
mistaken on that basis would indeed be a non sequitur of numbing grossness.  Kant is arguing in general 
that the very objective purport of our temporal concepts is an achievement of representation that 
already implicitly prescribes a general rule-governed lawfulness obtaining among the objects 
themselves. 
 
This misunderstanding is structurally analogous to a different one that I will call the 
“phenomenalist temptation.”  We saw that Kant’s analysis of our cognition of objective temporal 
orderings revealed the presupposition of various modal constraints on our actual and possible 
apprehendings of those orderings.  The temptation is to take Kant to be offering, in effect, a logical 
construction of the concept of an independent object of experience out of actual and possible states 
of appearing or apprehension.  After all, is Kant not starting his analysis from a position in which what 
is most certain or “given” is how things appear to the subject’s apprehension, and then arguing on that 
basis that modal constraints in the form of conceptual rules are required in order to construct or 
reconstruct our concept of an independent object of experience?  In this broad spirit James Van Cleve 
contends, for instance, that Kant’s objects as appearances, as the intentional objects of our cognition, 
are “logical constructions out of conscious states” (Van Cleve 1999, 50).  But again, this sort of 
interpretation grabs the wrong end of the analytic stick, in my view.  On Kant’s analysis, the possibility 
of our apprehending appearances in the ways that we do presupposes our conceptual cognition of 
independent objects as standing in their own lawful relations; the latter objective cognition is not a 
logical construction out of the former states of apprehension.  I will return to this admittedly fine but 
important distinction later on.   
 
Let us turn now, however, to the idea that this Kantian understanding of the application of 
concepts as presupposing the prescription of laws is a theme that has productively animated the 




II.  C. I. Lewis’s Pragmatic Conception of our Knowledge of Objects and Laws 
 
 
 The pragmatist tradition is of course many and varied, but for present purposes I want to focus 
on the “conceptualistic pragmatism” of C. I. Lewis (1929, xi; hereafter MWO).  It should at least be 
noted, however, that it was C. S. Peirce’s early anti-Cartesian articles of the 1860s and 1870s that 
arguably first set pragmatism on the particular path in which I am interested.  In his “Questions 
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Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” in 1868, Peirce argued (in a nutshell) that 
understanding the nature of any direct or immediate cognition of an object requires understanding the 
particular patterns of inferential embedding, whether habitual or also reasoned and critical, that 
constitute that particular cognition as the type of cognition that it is.  How such patterns of inference 
might relate to the idea that concepts implicitly prescribe law is a matter to which I shall return.  A 
decade later in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” Peirce formulated this outlook in terms of what came 
to be called his pragmatic maxim, as follows:5 
 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object 
of our conception to have.  Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object. (Peirce 1992, 132) 
 
For Peirce the content of a given concept of an object is understood primarily in terms of our 
conception of the lawful effects that are thus entailed or prescribed by that conception.  One central 
strain in William James’s thinking, too, similarly explicates what he calls our intentional or cognitive 
relation to objects in terms of the idea that the concept of a given kind of object functions essentially 
as a sign of ranges of anticipated or predictable consequences for future experience and practice.6   As 
anticipated, however, let us focus on C. I. Lewis’s more explicit development of the Kantian idea that 
the concept of an object of experience must be understood in terms of the prescription of laws. 
 
In his classic 1929 book, Mind and the World Order, Lewis argued that “knowledge of objects in 
general . . . always transcends the immediately given,” for although it “begins with the recognition of a 
qualitatively specific presentation” – that is, with the given as “a merely presented colligation of sense-
qualities” (MWO 49) – the conceptual cognition of an object of experience “is an interpretation which 
implicitly asserts certain relations between the given and further experience” (MWO 132; italics added).  Lewis 
then formulates the latter conceptual cognition of objects proper in terms of the implicit prescription 
of law, as in the following passage: 
 
Thus ... the recognition of what is presented as a real object of a certain kind, has already the significance of 
prediction and asserts the same general type of temporal connection as our knowledge of law, the ‘knowledge 
about’ which is stated in generalizations. (Lewis MWO 133, italics in original) 
 
Or again as Lewis puts the point in a later chapter: “...a world without law must likewise be a world 
without recognizable things.  The recognition of objects requires that same kind of order or reliable 
relatedness which law also requires” (MWO 320).  In this respect Lewis registers his agreement with 
Kant, remarking that Kant’s “deduction of the categories” argued soundly that “without the validity 
of categorial principles no experience is possible” (MWO 320).  Lewis opposes this correct Kantian 
view to what he says “Hume apparently” supposed, namely, “that we may take our world as a world 
of recognizable identifiable things while still doubting the validity of all generalizations such as natural 
law” (MWO 321).   While agreeing with Kant in this fundamental respect, however, Lewis’s famous 
 
5 For an in-depth analysis of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, see Hookway 2013.  For my own take on it, see O’Shea 
2008. 
 
6 I offer a more extended examination of these matters in Peirce and in the subsequent American pragmatist 
tradition (especially James, Lewis, and Sellars) in O’Shea (2008; cf. also O’Shea 2014).  For a more 
comprehensive emphasis on the importance of Peirce, Lewis, and Sellars in the pragmatist tradition, see Misak 
2013. 
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pragmatic conception of the a priori sought to reject “the Kantian assumption that experience is limited by 
modes of intuition and fixed forms of thought” (MWO 320).   For Lewis, that is, while it is true that 
some categorial prescription of law or other is necessary for the possible cognition of any object of 
experience as such, which among various alternative a priori categorial interpretations is to be embraced 
is a question of conceptual change that is subject to overall pragmatic evaluation.  
  
Later in chapter VIII of his 1946 book, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (1946; hereafter 
AKV), Lewis would further clarify that since the relevant hypotheticals in the assertion of law must 
support counterfactuals concerning what further sense-qualities would be given if such and such were 
experienced, the connections involved can (he explains) be neither (i) mere deductive entailments, nor 
even (ii) “strict implications” (in Lewis’s sense), and also not simply (iii) universally quantified material 
conditionals; rather, they must state what Lewis in AKV calls real connections or natural connections between 
matters-of-fact (AKV 227).  As he puts it, “this sense of “if–then” is the one connoted in any assertion 
of causal relationship or of connection according to natural law” (including probabilistic connections) 
(AKV 229). 
 
 So both Lewis’s pragmatic conception and Kant’s transcendental analysis explicate the concept 
of an independent object of experience in general in terms of the idea that such concepts prescribe 
laws governing possible experience.  In the case of Kant such transcendental laws govern all our 
possible temporal experience, whereas in the case of Lewis there will be laws governing the possible 
experience of whatever categorial kind of object (among alternatives) is at issue.  I will return to this 
latter difference below.  But we should ask first:  on the central issues concerning concepts, objectivity, 
and laws, with respect to which, as we have seen, Lewis takes himself to agree with Kant, is it in fact 
true that Lewis’s and Kant’s ways of understanding the idea that concepts of objects involve the 
prescription of law in general are basically two articulations of roughly the same philosophical thesis?   
 
Consider the following representative passage from Lewis, which follows as a clarification 
directly after his statement quoted above (MWO 133) that our recognition of real objects “has already 
the significance of prediction and asserts the same general type of temporal connection as our 
knowledge of law.”  Lewis adds: 
 
This is merely to reiterate Berkeley’s doctrine of the ‘idea’ as a sign, with the added thought 
that what is contained within any one idea or presentation is never more than a fragment of 
the nature of the real object.  The ascription of this objectivity to the presentation is the conceptual 
interpretation of what is presented. (MWO 133, italics in original) 
 
In saying that any one “idea or presentation is never more than a fragment of the nature of the real 
object,” Lewis is again appealing to what he characterizes as the “ineffable” sensuous quality of the 
given, about which he claims that “it is impossible to be mistaken” (MWO 125).  Lewis holds that any 
one presentation consists in the immediate “recognition” of a configuration of qualia “universals” 
(MWO 123) such as would be given to us, for example, by the presently facing aspect of whatever we 
might conceptually interpret to be the mind-independently persisting object currently in view.  The 
recognized qualia universals themselves, Lewis insists, are “purely subjective” and “must be 
distinguished from the properties of objects” (MWO 121). 
 
Now, from the perspective of the reading of Kant that I sketched earlier, Lewis, despite his 
frequent protestations against phenomenalism (e.g., MWO 154f., 165, 174ff.; AKV 187n, 200–2, 229), 
is clearly in danger of succumbing to the phenomenalist temptation understood as an obstacle to a 
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correct understanding of Kant’s views on concepts as prescribing laws to appearances.  There is thus, 
it would seem, a subtle but important difference between Lewis’s and Kant’s views even on this most 
fundamental matter concerning which Lewis agrees with Kant.  Lewis, as we have just seen (e.g., MWO 
132), takes his “purely subjective” and fragmentary qualia-presentations to be the contents that are to 
be related in the laws that concepts must prescribe if we are to have cognition of independent objects 
as such.  It is true that on Lewis’s view, as on Kant’s, we do conceive of objective causal relations as 
obtaining among the independent objects themselves.  But for Lewis this has its ultimate basis and 
analysis in the more fundamental conception of independent objects as constituted by concepts of 
lawful relations obtaining among actual and possible purely subjective qualia presentations, about 
which we cannot be mistaken (cf. in particular MWO 335–6).  Kant on my reading, by contrast, argued 
that it is only in light of our immediate conceptual cognition of the independent objects and their states 
themselves, as standing in lawful relations to one other,7 that we can understand and explain the 
possibility of our subjectively apprehending objects in the ways that we do.  As we saw Kant put it 
earlier, we “must therefore derive the subjective sequence of apprehension from the objective 
sequence of appearances...” (CPR A193/B238).   
 
Lewis’s views on these matters are complex, however, and for present purposes it will suffice 
to have raised the phenomenalist temptation as at least an initial worry about the otherwise compelling 
ways in which Lewis developed the core Kantian insight concerning our concepts of objects as 
involving the prescription of law.  I want now to suggest that Sellars’s understanding of “concepts as 
involving laws” (to borrow from the title of Sellars’s 1948 article) represented an attempt to preserve 
the core insights of both Lewis’s pragmatic conception of the a priori and Kant’s understanding of the 
categories, but in a way that furthermore sustains the above phenomenalist worry about Lewis’s view. 
 
 
III.  Sellars on Kant, Lewis, and Concepts as Involving Laws 
 
 
 Sellars in his 1976 article on “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism” (KTI)8 entertained and rejected 
(as I have also done here) what he regarded as the mistaken phenomenalist tendency of interpretation 
of Kant’s conception of objects as appearances.  By contrast he briefly summed up his own extended 
reconstruction of Kant’s views on the concept of an object of experience as follows: 
 
The object of a perceptual representing of a house is the non-perspectival content house; yet as 
the sort of item that can be the object of a perceptual representing, it must provide rules for 
explaining (together with other factors [involved in the relation between the house and the 
embodied sense-perceiver]) why such and such sequences of perceptual takings with 
perspectival contents were necessary. (Sellars KTI VII, §50; in KTM, 416) 
 
7 The qualification is perhaps unnecessary at this stage, but once again by “the independent objects themselves” 
here and elsewhere I am referring to the physical domain of Kant’s empirical realism, not to Kant’s conception 
of our inevitable but theoretically “problematic” ideas pertaining to unknowable “things in themselves” or 
“noumena” as the ultimate “ground” of appearances.  The positive content of the latter conception turns out 
on Kant’s view to be primarily in terms of practical reason’s indispensable ideas of freedom and morality.  For 
my own attitude toward the difficulties inherent in Kant’s transcendental idealism, see O’Shea 2012, index 
references under “idealism, transcendental.”  See also the final section below. 
 
8 For a key to the abbreviations of Sellars’ works see the reference list. 
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This interpretation fits the non-phenomenalist reading of Kant I offered above.  Furthermore, with 
respect to the key points concerning concepts, objectivity, and laws on which Lewis takes himself to 
be in agreement with Kant’s deduction, Sellars similarly diagnoses Lewis’s view as occupying an 
insightful but unstable position in which a broadly correct Kantian conception of our knowledge of 
objects in terms of the prescription of law is supported by analyses that in effect succumb to the 
phenomenalist temptation (cf. Sellars RNWW, VI §30, fn. 8).  Put roughly, Sellars contends that Lewis 
officially has his heart in the right place with respect to the constitutive role of our concepts of “real 
connections” as making possible our cognition of independent objects as such; but unfortunately, he 
suggests, Lewis “tacitly” (and as we have seen, sometimes explicitly) analyzes such connections in terms 
of relations among “phenomenal given-nesses,” as Sellars puts it (Sellars RNWW, VI §30, fn. 8).  But 
as we saw, this would be to invert the correct order of understanding and explanation that is involved 
in the crucial points on which Lewis wants to agree with Kant.   
 
Considerations of Lewis interpretation aside, Sellars had argued in his article on 
“Phenomenalism” (1963, written in 1959) that any attempted analysis of objects in terms of supposed 
laws governing actual and conditional sense-presentations must ultimately founder on the fact that – 
to oversimplify the argument – the alleged generalizations to which appeal would have to be made can 
be shown to be unavailable independently of various background assumptions concerning the physical 
situations and conditions in which perceivers have found themselves (cf. PHM, part III; see also 
Brandom 2009, 41–6).  Compare in this respect Lewis, who – despite his proper emphasis on the need 
for concepts of necessary lawful connections in our knowledge of objects – similarly attempts to 
ground our empirical knowledge ultimately in alleged uniformities or “progressions” in “the immediate 
awareness of the given,” which then “may become explicit in generalizations of the form ‘What appears 
like this will turn out thus and so’ ” (MWO 335–6).  On Sellars’s view (and as I hold, on Kant’s view), 
by contrast, there is no more basic level of analysis of our thought and cognition than in terms of our 
concepts of independent, perceivable physical objects with their objective properties and lawful 
relations, which thereby serve to explain, along with other factors, the nature of our perspectival 
sensory apprehensions of such objects as they make their appearances to us in perception (cf. the 
quotation above from Sellars KTI VII, §50).  This, Sellars contends, was the view of Kant, and also of 
Lewis in his better moments. 
 
However, while Sellars thus takes Lewis’s view to be hampered by the phenomenalist 
temptation, he enthusiastically endorses the main thrust not only of Lewis’s Kantian emphasis on 
concepts as prescribing law, but also Lewis’s hallmark pragmatic conception of the a priori.  As Sellars 
remarks at the end of his 1953 article on “Inference and Meaning” (IM):  “my only major complaint 
concerning [Lewis’s] brilliant analysis in Mind and the World Order is that he speaks of the a priori as 
analytic, and tends to limit it to propositions involving only the more generic elements of a conceptual 
structure (his ‘categories’)” (IM VI, §48).  What we might call Sellars’s own Kantian pragmatist account 
of these matters, put briefly, is as follows. 
 
In relation to Kant, Sellars defended Kant’s general contention that, as Sellars formulates it, 
“the concept of empirical knowledge involves the concept of inferability in accordance with laws of 
nature.  To grant that there is knowledge of the here and now is ... to grant that there are general truths 
of the sort captured by lawlike statements” (Sellars, “Toward a Theory of the Categories,” TTC VIII, 
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§54; cf. KTE VII, §36).9  On Sellars’s reading of Kant it is thus “an analytic truth that objects of 
empirical knowledge conform to logically synthetic universal principles” (KTE II, §10).  I take Sellars 
to hold that Kant was right about this, but in Sellars’s own voice this conception of cognition as 
prescribing laws to nature, rather than being presented as a defence of “the synthetic a priori” per se, 
becomes rather the following thesis concerning the nature of conceptual content (this is from his 1953 
article, “Is There a Synthetic ‘A Priori’?”): 
 
Let me now put my thesis by saying that the conceptual meaning of a descriptive term is 
constituted by what can be inferred from it in accordance with the logical and extra-logical 
rules of inference of the language (conceptual frame) to which it belongs. [...]  [W]here ‘x is B’ 
can be validly inferred from ‘x is A,’ the proposition ‘All A is B’ is unconditionally assertable 
on the basis of the rules of the language.  Our thesis, then, implies that every primitive 
descriptive predicate occurs in one or more logically synthetic propositions which are 
unconditionally assertable.... (Sellars ITSA, 317) 
 
Or as he elsewhere puts essentially the same broadly Kantian thesis: it “is only because the expressions 
in terms of which we describe objects . . . locate these objects in a space of implications, that they 
describe at all, rather than merely label” (Sellars, “Counterfactuals, Dispositions, and the Causal 
Modalities,” CDCM 306–7, §108). 
 
In relation to Lewis, however, Sellars argues in agreement with the spirit if not the letter of 
Lewis’s pragmatic conception of the a priori that the “logically synthetic” or “material” principles of 
inference that thus prescribe laws as “unconditionally assertible” within any given conceptual 
framework – and which accordingly, in this sense, have the intra-framework status of substantive 
conceptual truths that hold independently of experience (i.e., hold a priori) – are themselves open to 
empirically informed pragmatic abandonment and replacement on grounds of explanatory superiority.  
Thus on Sellars’s pragmatic conception of the a priori, “while every conceptual frame involves 
propositions which, though synthetic, are true ex vi terminorum, every conceptual frame is also but one 
among many which compete for adoption in the market-place of experience” (ITSA, 320; cf. IM VI 
§48).   
 
Sellars’s conception of concepts as prescribing law is thus, like Lewis’s, and despite their 
significant differences, properly viewed as attempting to harmonize the truths contained in Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy with the more fallibilist insights of American pragmatism.10  I should note, 
however, that there is a further underlying naturalistic dimension to Sellars’s account that forms no 
part either of Kant’s philosophy or of Lewis’s.  For Sellars, “the ultimate point of all the logical powers 
pertaining to conceptual activity in its epistemic orientation is to generate conceptual structures which 
as objects in nature stand in certain matter-of-factual relations to other objects in nature” (KTE III, §27; 
italics added).  Here Sellars is referring to his naturalistic account of mental and linguistic representation 
or “picturing.”  On Sellars’s unique version of a naturalism with a normative turn, our normatively 
rule-governed linguistic practices by their very nature, in certain domains, continually generate and 
sustain various underlying mapping-and-tracking isomorphisms that obtain between the properties and 
 
9 I emphasize the Kantian “transcendental” dimensions of Sellars’s thought in O’Shea 2007. See especially 
chapter five, section III, on Sellars on “epistemic principles.” 
 
10 For a recent particularly insightful examination of links between Kant’s transcendental philosophy and the 
fallibilism characteristic of the pragmatist tradition, see Gava 2014. 
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relations of the representing events or tokens themselves, naturalistically described, and the 
corresponding properties and relations of the objects and uniformities in nature that are thereby 
mapped or represented (cf. O’Shea 2007, chapter six, and Sellars “Truth and ‘Correspondence’” (TC), 
part III).   
 
 The ontological upshot as far as Sellars was concerned is that for him in the end there really are 
no necessities or modal constraints in nature as it is in itself (as pictured in what Sellars calls the ideal 
“scientific image of man-in-the-world”) – no modal properties “out there,” he wants ultimately to 
argue, over and above the uniformities in the patterns and processes that our rule-governed 
representings come, in this indirect way, to map and track.11  Sellars in this “picturing” context offers 
the following critical comment on Kant (and on Peirce): 
 
The basic flaw in the Kantian system (as in that of Peirce) is in its inability to do justice to this 
fact.  The [Kantian] insight that logical form belongs only to conceptual acts (i.e., to ‘thoughts’ 
rather than to ‘things’) must be supplemented by the insight that ‘thoughts’ as well as ‘things’ 
must have empirical form if they are to mesh with each other in that way [i.e., as involving 
cognitive-environmental mappings and trackings] which is essential to empirical knowledge.  
(KTE III, §27, fn. 7; interpolations added)   
 
Overall, then, Sellars thus took his own particularly strong explanatory replacement version of the ideal 
scientific naturalist ontology, along with his (I think insightful, if problematic) account of the necessary 
naturalistic picturing dimension of any cognitive representation of a world, to be significant and 
necessary additions to the Kantian and pragmatist accounts of concepts of objects as involving the 
prescription of law.  But it is important to stress that it is only the latter Kantian pragmatist thesis itself 
that I have been concerned to highlight here.  This is arguably detachable in its core claims from the 
former, more controversial aspects of Sellars’s views.  One analytic pragmatist who has argued along 
similar lines is Robert Brandom, and I will close with some reflections on Brandom’s important recent 
defenses of what he calls the “Kant-Sellars thesis” (e.g. 2009, ch. 4), as well as on some lingering 
questions concerning realism and idealism. 
 
 
IV.  Concluding Reflections on Brandom’s “Kant-Sellars Thesis” and on Idealism 
 
 
 The necessary connection I have been clarifying and comparing in Kant, Lewis, and Sellars – 
namely, between the possibility of our having contentful concepts of objects (and hence, of 
intentionality itself) and the conception of those objects and their states as necessarily subject to 
objective lawful connections in general – has in recent years been defended with particular force in 
Brandom’s analytic pragmatism (cf. Brandom 2008; 2009; 2015).  Brandom’s Kant-Sellars thesis 
comprises the following two theses: 
 
 
11 For Sellars’s speculations on what such an ultimately non-modal “process” ontology might look like, see for 
example his extended analogy between his own process ontology (as the regulative ideal of a completed 
“scientific image” of the world) and the similarly non-“manifest image” or “alternative framework” of Russellian 
logical atomism and neutral monism: Sellars FMPP, Lecture II, “Naturalism and Process,” especially §§80–96, 
53–5.  For important recent criticisms of these particular aspects of Sellars’s thought, while otherwise defending 
Sellars’s general outlook on concepts and laws (as I shall note briefly in closing), see Brandom 2015. 
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(1) In using ordinary empirical vocabulary, one already knows how to do everything one needs 
to know how to do in order to introduce and deploy modal vocabulary. 
 
(2) The expressive role characteristic of alethic modal vocabulary is to make explicit semantic, 
conceptual connections and commitments that are already implicit in the use of ordinary 
empirical vocabulary.  (Brandom 2009, 102). 
 
We can immediately see the connection of (1) with the themes analyzed above in Kant, Lewis, and 
Sellars.   
 
First we saw Kant argue, as central to what I characterized as his modal conception of 
objectivity, that our possible awareness of any object of experience presupposes the objective validity 
of our implicit conceptions of such objects as mind-independent material phenomena subject to 
empirically lawful causal connections in general.  Second, C. I. Lewis pragmatically transposed this 
recognition of the necessary connection between our possible experience of any mind-independent 
objects and the a priori prescription of natural law.  His pragmatic conception of alternative a priori 
analytic frameworks of such object-constituting, law-prescribing concepts properly conceives such 
frameworks as subject to abandonment and replacement on pragmatic and explanatory grounds.  
Finally, Sellars corrected certain important inadequacies in Lewis’s conception of our concepts of 
objects and laws – which, crudely put, had been conducted in terms of the twin resources of the 
‘analytic a priori’ plus the ‘phenomenal given’ – as having been insightfully mistaken on both counts, 
as it were.  That is, a correct Kantian pragmatist account of our cognition requires (a) construing 
meaning and conceptual content in terms of world-involving and counterfactual sustaining material 
inference principles (in Sellars’s sense); and (b) abjuring Lewis’s problematic ground level appeal to an 
allegedly ineffable yet incorrigible recognition of “the given” in the form of presentations of 
phenomenal qualia-complexes.  We also saw that Kant, Lewis, and Sellars all hold, however, that having 
any concept of an empirical object at all already presupposes the implicit prescription of a rule-
governed modal lawfulness pertaining to the direct objects of our experience (cf. Brandom’s (1) above).   
 
Brandom’s (1) and (2) represent his way of articulating and developing this Kant-Sellars thesis 
in terms of his own complex conception of pragmatically mediated semantic relations obtaining among 
vocabularies that have different norm-governed pragmatic uses and explicitating functions.   In the 
case at hand, Brandom pragmatically analyzes what we briefly saw to be Sellars’s material inference-
license or “space of implications” conception of the causal modalities (see also Ryle 1950).  His 
contention is that the practice of “deploying any ordinary empirical vocabulary,” however simple (e.g., 
“this is red”), already presupposes “counterfactually robust inferential practices-or-abilities – more 
specifically, the practical capacity to associate with materially good inferences ranges of counterfactual 
robustness” (Brandom 2008, 103, italics in original).   
 
Without attempting to elucidate Brandom’s argument here (cf. 2008, 103–9), it depends on the 
general inferentialist outlook on meaning and conceptual content briefly noted earlier in relation to 
Sellars.  On Brandom’s view, “to count as deploying any vocabulary at all” – for example, in describing 
anything as opposed to mere labeling or parroting – “one must treat some inferences involving it as 
good and others as bad.  Otherwise, one’s utterances are wholly devoid conceptual content” (Brandom 
2008, 106).  A stock example at the basic empirical level would concern the inferential abilities 
presupposed, on this view, by the mere ability to recognize something as red.  Brandom had explained 
it this way in Making It Explicit: 
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The leading idea of the approach to content and understanding to be developed here is due to 
Sellars.  Sellars’s suggestion is that the key element missing from the parrot and the measuring 
instrument—the difference between merely responsive classification and conceptual 
classification—is their mastery of the practices of giving and asking for reasons, in which their 
responses can play a role as justifying beliefs and claims.  To grasp or understand a concept is, 
according to Sellars, to have practical mastery over the inferences it is involved in – to know, in 
the practical sense of being able to distinguish, what follows from the applicability of a concept, 
and what it follows from.  The parrot does not treat ‘That’s red’ as incompatible with ‘That’s 
green,’ nor as flowing from ‘That’s scarlet’ and entailing ‘That’s colored.’  Insofar as the 
repeatable response is not, for the parrot, caught up in practical proprieties of inference and 
justification, and so of the making of further judgments, it is not a conceptual or a cognitive 
matter at all….One immediate consequence of such an inferential demarcation of the 
conceptual is that one must have many concepts in order to have any. (Brandom 1994, 89) 
 
The next step is to recognize the role of “if–then” conditionals as codifying or making explicit the 
inferential commitments and entitlements that are thus presupposed by the given concept (e.g., “if 
that’s green, then it’s not red”).  Such inferential commitments by their nature involve treating some 
inferential, experiential, or practical consequences or other as incompatible with the application of the 
given concept, and others as confirming or at least not incompatible with it.  And as Lewis and Sellars 
had both argued,12 this implicit sorting of the necessary and possible consequences that would follow 
from the correct application of a concept in various scenarios requires that the relevant conditionals 
have a counterfactual sustaining force of the sort characteristic of natural causal laws (though perhaps 
not exclusive to laws alone: cf. Brandom 2009, 105).13  Brandom mobilizes further support for this 
conclusion through an analysis of the non-monotonic, defeasible inferences marked by ceteris paribus 
clauses that are characteristic of the special sciences, but I will not pursue those arguments here (cf. 
2009, 106–9). 
 
Brandom draws one particularly important consequence from his modal Kant-Sellars thesis 
that runs against classical empiricist outlooks from Hume to Quine.  As we saw Lewis put it above, 
“Hume apparently [supposed] that we may take our world as a world of recognizable identifiable things 
while still doubting the validity of all generalizations such as natural law” (MWO 321).  To the contrary, 
for Brandom as for Kant, Lewis, and Sellars, both the Humean sceptical challenge and Quine’s 
challenge to the philosophical respectability of modal notions are based on a more fundamental 
misconception:   
 
[For] that challenge is predicated on the idea of an independently and antecedently intelligible 
stratum of empirical discourse that is purely descriptive and involves no modal commitments, 
 
12 Compare this example from Lewis’s Mind and the World-Order:  “A mouse which disappears where there is no 
hole, is no real mouse . . . . The reality of an object of a particular sort is determined by a certain uniformity of 
its behavior in experience.  The formulation of this uniformity is of the type of natural law” (MWO 261).   
 
13 Brandom argues that in fact “every claim, whether contingent or not, supports some counterfactual inferences, 
and if one grasped none of them one would not qualify as understanding those claims” (2009, 105).  The 
differences concern “the character of the particular ranges of counterfactual robustness. For the accidental 
generalization that all the coins in my pocket are copper does underwrite counterfactuals such as: ‘If I were to 
choose a coin at random from my pocket, it would be copper’ ” (2009, 105). 
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as a semantically autonomous background and model with which the credentials of modal 
discourse can then be invidiously compared.  One of Kant’s most basic ideas, revived by Sellars, 
is that this idea is mistaken.  The ability to use ordinary empirical descriptive terms such as ‘green,’ ‘rigid,’ 
and ‘mass’ already presupposes grasp of the kinds of properties and relations made explicit by modal vocabulary.  
(Brandom 2009, 96–7, italics in original) 
 
We saw earlier that one way of misconstruing the famous proof of the principle of causality in Kant’s 
second analogy was Strawson’s accusation that Kant inferred invalidly from the correct idea that the 
relations among the independent objects of our perceptions (even if they are entirely contingent) have 
certain necessary consequences for the possible ordering of our perceptions of those objective sequences, 
to the desired but unreached conclusion that there are necessary connections obtaining in the 
corresponding objects themselves.  To the contrary, however, we saw Kant’s actual argument to be 
that no perception of any objective state of affairs in time is possible at all in the first place unless we 
already conceive the objects of our experience to be themselves governed by necessary causal 
connections.   
 
The case is similar with respect to what I called the “phenomenalist temptation,” both as an 
unfortunate tendency in the interpretation of Kant and as impairing C. I. Lewis’s better insights.  It is 
ultimately unintelligible to suppose that our ordinary conceptions of the objective physical world could 
be reconstructed in terms of conditionals or expectations that allegedly apply at bottom to what Lewis 
(unfortunately) conceived as the “coincidence of. . .progressions in immediacy,” i.e. among ineffably 
but unmistakably recognized qualia presentations, the given (MWO 335).  On Lewis’s view, at bottom, 
“we have in the immediate awareness of the given that certainty which becomes the basis of a probable 
knowledge of the particular object or the occurrence of an objective property” (MWO 335–6).  To the 
contrary, for Kant, Sellars, and Brandom, the possibility of the “immediate presentation” of any 
recognizable items in cognition already presupposes their implicit conceptualization within what Lewis 
himself characterizes as the directly knowable world of law-governed physical objects.  There is no 
empirically accessible yet modally innocent domain for cognitive awareness that falls short of our direct 
cognition of a mind-independent and law-governed world of persisting physical objects. 
 
I will close by remarking on some important general issues that are raised by this enduring 
transcendental pragmatist outlook on the nature of our concepts of objects as involving the 
prescription of law.  The first concerns the question of modal realism, and how this might relate to 
more general longstanding disputes about realism and idealism in the Kantian, Hegelian and pragmatist 
traditions; and the second concerns the nature of human thought and intentionality as presented in the 
main line of thought defended here. 
 
Brandom takes his working out of the modal Kant-Sellars thesis to constitute a pragmatic modal 
expressivism, in that what we are doing in applying modal vocabulary is expressing or making explicit the 
conceptual connections and commitments that are already implicit in our ordinary uses of empirical 
concepts.  For Brandom, however, the objective correlate of this modal expressivism is a semantic modal 
realism, in that what we are saying in applying modal vocabulary is that various modal properties, 
relations, and facts (for example, necessary causal connections) are instantiated or obtain in the 
objectively real empirical world.  In fact, Brandom sees his view as one that “puts modal expressivism 
and modal realism together again” precisely because it is “recognizably a development and a 
descendant, for this special but central case, of Kant’s claim that one should be a transcendental idealist, 
but an empirical realist” (Brandom, 2015, 215).   
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I cannot explore the details of Brandom’s views on these last matters here, but basically the 
“idealist” aspect of the modal Kant-Sellars thesis is the idea that what is meant by our claims about 
what objective facts and laws there are in the world is dependent for its very sense on aspects of our 
norm-governed practices of asserting claims and making inferences.  The modal realist semantics is 
thus “sense-dependent,” as Brandom puts it, on the modal expressivist pragmatics.  Put in Kant’s 
terms, this entails the transcendental idealist thesis that, for example, any causally lawful world must 
be one in which certain corresponding normative inferential practices and commitments would also 
be in place.  But this sense-dependence does not entail the absurd “reference-dependence” thesis such 
that there could not exist in objective reality any facts and laws without the existence of corresponding 
practices of assertion or inference (Brandom 2015, 207–15).  There were objective facts and laws 
concerning the melting point of copper, for instance, before any human beings evolved with the 
capacity to make the corresponding assertions and inferences. 
 
I think there is much to be said for this conception as a sympathetic interpretation and 
development of Kant’s transcendental idealism. In the present context, however, I just want to link 
this last set of issues to the remarks I made at the end of the previous section concerning Sellars’s 
scientific naturalism and his ontological nominalism. As we saw, Sellars himself put forward his 
normative inference-license conception of the causal modalities as part of a wider package of 
naturalistic views concerning, in particular, “matter-of-factual” empirical truth as a certain kind of 
extensional picturing-correspondence or cognitive tracking relation obtaining between patterns of 
representational processes and corresponding patterns and uniformities in the environment.  On 
Sellars’s view while the normative pragmatics governing our modal and other inferential and 
explanatory practices succeeds in generating such representational systems and subjecting them to 
rational criticism, at bottom there are no modal facts, properties, and relations out there in nature itself.  
Sellars in fact saw his own thoroughgoing Kantian naturalism as providing the only ultimately coherent 
way to advance beyond the insightful idealisms of Kant and Hegel to a strongly scientific naturalist, 
non-idealist, and nominalistic vision of the true nature of empirical reality.  
 
The situation here ends up quite complex dialectically, in my view, with respect to the 
relationships between transcendental philosophy and the pragmatist tradition.  With respect to familiar 
controversies concerning the interpretation of “things in themselves” in Kant’s transcendental 
idealism, Sellars assumed a strong ontological reading such that it made sense for him – to put it crudely 
– to equate Kant’s “empirically real” phenomenal world (the realm of appearances) with what Sellars 
called the “manifest image” of the world: that is, roughly, with the common sense ontology of 
perceptible, intrinsically colored physical objects that is ultimately to be replaced by the explanatorily 
superior object-ontology of advancing theoretical science (the latter giving us Sellars’s own version of 
“things as they are in themselves”).  C. I. Lewis likewise seems to have read Kant’s “things in 
themselves” as an entirely objectionable metaphysical view, one that he clearly regards as best set aside 
for the purposes of developing his own Kantian-pragmatist views in Mind and the World-Order.  
According to the latter, as Lewis himself remarks, “it may be that between a sufficiently critical idealism 
and a sufficiently critical realism, there are no issues save false issues which arise from the insidious 
fallacies of the copy-theory of knowledge” (MWO 194).  
 
For my own part, however, I am among those who read Kant’s transcendental idealism in a 
way that renders it closer to Lewis’s own positive views, and perhaps in some ways closer as well to 
the spirit of Brandom’s sympathetic reading of Kant’s idealism in terms of a reciprocal sense-
dependence rather than reference-dependence.  From this perspective, Kant’s empirical realism is real 
realism, so to speak, and it can include within it (rather than in competition with it) whatever 
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unobservable entities science might lawfully posit within the single spatio-temporal-causal framework 
of nature.  On this more sympathetic outlook, while Kant’s conception of the ineliminable thought of 
“things as they are in themselves” does play multiple crucial roles in his philosophy, it does not on 
these readings play the sorts of primary and objectionable ontological roles that have been supposed 
by many of the critics of Kant’s transcendental idealism (including Lewis and, in part, Sellars).  
 
As I have said, I think that the central line of thought examined in this paper concerning 
concepts of empirical objects as involving the prescription of law can be detached from these 
important wider debates concerning realism and idealism.  But I think it should be noted that Sellars’s 
ultimate dissatisfaction with the sorts of idealism to be found not only in Kant and Hegel but also in 
aspects of the pragmatisms of Peirce, Lewis, and Brandom as well, partly reflects a scientific naturalist 
and Darwinian strain to be found throughout the history of American pragmatism.  Pragmatism, no 
less than the interpretation of Kant, continues to have a complex and uneasy relationship with idealism. 
 
 With respect to the main topic of this chapter, however, I would argue that the normative 
functionalist or rule-governed conception of intentionality and objectivity here traced and defended in 
a line of thought from Kant through Lewis, Sellars, and Brandom, represents one of the single most 
important choice points in the philosophy of mind and the theory of meaning.  For it is undeniable 
that many philosophers, perhaps the majority, have held and continue to hold views of the nature of 
intentionality and meaning that are inconsistent from the ground up with the Kantian pragmatist 
outlook defended here.    Nonetheless I have argued that the Kantian pragmatist tradition has given 
us compelling reason to believe that those more prevalent conceptions of our thinking and 
experiencing nature conceal incoherencies that render a genuinely satisfactory conception of the place 
of mind in nature impossible, and that a fundamentally different and better way of thinking about these 
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